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#2A-6/5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU (NASSAU COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE), 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8 301 
ADJUNCT FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF 
NASSAU COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Charging Party. 
BEE. DE ANGELIS & EISMAN, for Respondent 
AXELROD. CORNACHIO & FAMIGHETTI (MICHAEL C. 
AXELROD, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Adjunct 
Faculty Association of Nassau Community College (hereinafter 
Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(hereinafter ALJ) dismissing its charge that the County of 
Nassau (Nassau Community College) (hereinafter the College) 
violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. The Association 
argues that the College violated the Law by refusing to 
continue the term of an expired agreement which reguires the 
assignment of courses to unit employees solely on the basis 
10374 
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of seniority. 
The charge was filed after the president of the College 
issued a statement that the College would no longer honor the 
seniority provisions of its expired collective bargaining 
agreement with the Association "to the extent that they may 
require that adjunct course assignment be made solely on the 
basis of seniority." Almost a year before this statement was 
issued, the College had brought a charge against the 
Association complaining that the Association had violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith by insisting upon the 
continuation in their successor contract of the seniority 
provision which is at issue here. The College contended that 
the seniority provision was not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation because assignment on the basis of qualification 
is a management prerogative. 
2/ The ALJ dismissed that charge.— She concluded that 
the expired seniority provision would not be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation if it required an assignment to be 
made solely on the basis of seniority, but that it 
incorporated "an understanding that the employer's right to 
i^The charge had originally complained that the 
conduct of the College also violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and 
(d) of the Taylor Law. The Association has not filed 
exceptions to those parts of the ALJ's decision which
 ; 
dismissed these specifications of the charge. 
1/Adjunct Faculty Association. 18 PERB V4557 (1985). 
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3/ determine qualifications for appointment is unrestricted."-
The ALJ dismissed the instant charge on the ground that 
the seniority provision of the expired agreement did not 
require that course assignments be made solely on the basis 
of seniority. In support of its exceptions, the Association 
argues that this conclusion is in error because the parties' 
past practice demonstrates that seniority had been the sole 
basis for assignment. We decline to consider this 
. y 
argument. 
There is an identity of parties in both the earlier and 
the instant case and the ALJ resolved the very issue in 
question here — whether the seniority clause in the expired 
agreement made seniority the sole basis for appointment or 
subordinated seniority to the College's right to determine 
2/ld., at 4623. In its brief to the ALJ in the 
earlier decision, the Association noted that other ALJ 
decisions had held that seniority proposals improperly 
restricted school districts' managerial prerogative to 
establish qualifications for positions, but that in the 
instant case "[t]here is no dispute between the parties 
that the County [College] has a right to establish 
qualifications for employment and seniority." 
Neither party filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision in 
the earlier case. The College, however, moved this Board 
for an order reopening the record to take additional 
evidence. That motion was denied. Adjunct Faculty 
Association. 18 PERB tf3076 (1985). 
4/We do note, however, that there is no record 
evidence to support it. 
10376 
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qualifications. She concluded that the clause subordinated 
seniority to the College's right to determine 
qualifications. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, which 
is part of the broader doctrine of res judicata, precludes a 
party from relitigating an issue that was decided in a 
5/ 
earlier case to which it was a party.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 5, 19 8 6 
Albany, New York 
7fanoZgQ.AU /J2sy/-t4*^tst^_^' 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mertfoer 
•^/K. C. Davis. Administrative Law Treatise. Second 
Edition. §21:2. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-783 9 
WAPPINGERS FEDERATION OF TRANSIT, 
CUSTODIAL AND MAINTENANCE WORKERS, 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
Charging Party. 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE. P.C. (MAUREEN McNAMARA, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
HARRY W. FAIRBANK. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Wappingers Central School District (District) to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by contracting out the 
transportation of handicapped students without having 
negotiated its decision to do so with the Wappingers 
Federation of Transit, Custodial and Maintenance Workers, 
New York State United Teachers (Federation).— The 
i/The matter came to us previously on a motion of the 
Federation to dismiss the exceptions on the ground that 
they were not timely. We found the exceptions timely and 
denied the motion (19 PERB ir3012 [1986]). 
-16378 
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Federation complains that this contract occasioned the 
2/ temporary layoff of eleven drivers.— 
The District acknowledges that it made a unilateral 
decision to contract out the transportation of handicapped 
students. It makes two arguments in justification of its 
conduct. The first is that it was free to contract out the 
transportation of handicapped students because it was 
confronted by an emergency situation. The elements of the 
emergency are: (1) the station wagons normally used for such 
transportation were unservicable; (2) the voters had defeated 
. . . 3/ 
two resolutions authorizing the acquisition of new buses;-
(3) it was unable to rent buses from other school districts. 
boards of cooperative educational services or county vocational 
4/ 
education and extension boards;— and (4) the Commissioner of 
Education had permitted it to rent buses from private sources 
5/ for a 90-day emergency period only.— Thus, according to the 
^./AII eleven drivers had been recalled by the time the 
record herein was closed. 
•^ ./Education Law §1709.25. a subjects the power of a board 
of education to purchase motor vehicles to the authorization 
of qualified voters. 
^Such rental is authorized by Education Law §1709.25.b. 
5/The regulations of the Commissioner of Education 
(8 NYCRR §156.6) permit the leasing of school buses from 
private sector sources under emergency conditions subject to 
approval by the Commissioner. Such approval is for a period 
not to exceed 90 days, but the period may be extended by the 
Commissioner if an emergency persists. 
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District, the sole option available to it in the performance 
of an essential service was to contract out the 
transportation of handicapped students. 
The District's second argument is that it was under no 
duty to initiate negotiations. Rathex, according to the 
District, it is sufficient that it was willing to negotiate 
upon a demand of the Federation once the Federation had been 
notified of the contemplated contract in late September or 
early October 1984. Thus, the District asserts, the 
Federation waived its right to negotiate by making no such 
demand. 
The conditions under which an emergency situation may 
allow for unilateral action are set forth in an earlier 
6 / 
Wappinqer Central School District case.— It holds that 
the employer must first have negotiated to impasse. It may 
then act unilaterally with respect to a matter concerning 
which time is of the essence, but it must indicate its 
willingness to continue to negotiate thereafter. The 
District argues that this doctrine should be expanded to 
permit unilateral action without prior negotiations where the 
emergency is acute and immediate. 
The emergency, even if acute, was not immediate. The 
record shows that the District knew of the emergency by 
August 30. It was given permission by the Commissioner of 
y$ PERB 1F3074 (1972). 10380 
Board - U-7839 -4 
Education to rent buses from the private sector on an 
emergency basis for 90 days and did so. It never sought to 
negotiate the issue of contracting out part of its bus 
service, neither did it seek an extension of the 90-day 
emergency.period. Finally, it contracted out the bus 
services effective 30 days before the end of the 90-day 
emergency period. 
We conclude that the principles articulated in the 
earlier Wappinqer Central School District case apply in these 
circumstances. The District should have initiated 
negotiations at least by August 30, 1984, when it knew of the 
emergency. The duty to do so falls upon the public employer 
) contemplating a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment of its employees and not on the employee 
7/ organization that represents them.— 
It is not unlikely that the parties could have reached 
an agreement during the 90-day emergency period during which 
the Education Commissioner permitted the District to rent 
motor vehicles from the private sector. Failing that, the 
negotiations might have become deadlocked, thereby triggering 
the exception to the prohibition of unilateral action 
articulated in the earlier Wappinqer Central School 
District. Moreover, if requested to do so by the District, 
the Education Commissioner might have extended the 90-day 
2/County of Orange, 12 PERB 1P114 (1979). 10381 
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emergency period — especially if the parties were seeking a 
mutually acceptable resolution to the problem through 
negotiations. Accordingly, we reject the two bases of the 
8 / 
District's exceptions.— 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District: 
1. to negotiate in good faith with the 
Federation concerning unit members' 
terms and conditions of employment; 
2. unless the parties agree otherwise in 
such negotiations, to restore all unit 
work subcontracted on November 1, 1984, 
to unit employees, effective upon the 
opening of school in September 1986. 
i-^ The District's exceptions give two other reasons 
for reversing the ALJ but they are not developed in its 
brief. One is that the ALJ should not have admitted the 
testimony of the witness named Peter Borzi because that 
testimony was unreliable. We find no error here. The 
standards for admission of evidence in an administrative 
hearing is very liberal. Reliance upon that testimony 
would have been a different matter, but the ALJ did not do 
so. 
The other is that the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement contained a job security clause covering 
full-time workers but not part-time workers, and that the 
eleven laid off workers were all part-timers. The District 
contends that this constitutes a waiver by the Federation 
of its right to object to the layoff of the eleven 
employees. This contention is irrelevant to the issue 
before us. It is not the layoffs that make the contracting 
out improper, it is the removal of unit work (Niagara 
Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB tf3083 [1985]). 
Layoffs per se may be proper, but not if they are the 
result of unilateral action that is itself improper. 
JJ38 
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3. to pay to unit members any lost wages 
and benefits suffered as a result of 
such subcontracting, plus interest at 
the legal rate; and 
4. to sign and post the attached jiotice at 
all locations customarily used to post 
communications to unit members. 
DATED: June 5, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UJLUZZ-Z*^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify a ^ employees in the unit represented by the 
Wappingers Federation of Transit, Custodial and Maintenance 
Workers, New York State United Teachers, that the Wappingers 
Central School District: 
1. Will negotiate in good faith with the Federation 
concerning unit members' terms and conditions of 
. employment. 
2. Will, unless the parties agree otherwise in such 
negotiations, restore all unit work subcontracted on 
November 1. 1984. to unit employees, effective upon the 
opening of school in September 1986. 
3. Will pay to unit members any lost wages and 
benefits suffered as a result of such subcontracting, 
plus interest at the legal rate. 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
10384 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2C-6/5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE NORTH BABYLON CASE NO. E-1158 
UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
SY HOROWITZ, for the Office of Personnel Chapter of 
the North Babylon Teachers Organization 
AUGUST J. GINOCCHIO. ESQ., for the Board of Education 
of the North Babylon Union Free School District 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The application herein was filed by the Board of 
Education of the North Babylon Union Free School District 
(District) on September 24, 1985. It seeks the designation of 
several employees in a negotiating unit represented by the 
North Babylon Teachers Organization (Organization) as 
confidential for the purposes of the Taylor Law.— 
Under §201.10(b) of our Rules of Procedure, such an 
application could have been filed during the fourth or fifth 
month of the fiscal year of the District, i.e. October or 
November. Accordingly, the application herein was filed 
prematurely. This procedural infirmity was not noticed by our 
staff in its initial processing of the application or by the 
Organization when it was first served with the application. 
i/See §201.7(a) of the Taylor Law. 0385 
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It was therefore assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
for a hearing on the merits of the issues formulated by it and 
the response of the Organization in opposition. 
The prematurity of the application was first noticed by 
the ALJ after the passage of the period when a timely 
application could have been filed. He notified the District of 
the defect and urged it to withdraw the application. When the 
District refused, he returned the file to the Director who 
dismissed the application. In doing so, he relied upon a 
2/ decision of the State Supreme Court- holding that it is 
arbitrary and capricious for this Board to waive its own rules 
by processing a prematurely filed petition when doing so would 
prejudice the rights of a party opposing the petition. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
District. It would distinguish Cattaraugus on the ground that 
the party opposing the petition had moved to preclude 
consideration of it in that case while the Organization made no 
motion to preclude consideration of the application here. 
According to the District, the Director should not have 
dismissed the application sua sponte after the time to file a 
new application had passed. It argues that the Organization 
would not have been prejudiced if the Director had not enforced 
the timeliness rule because it never relied upon that rule, but 
^/Cattaraugus County Chapter of CSEA v. Helsby, 3 PERB 
1F7005. (Rensselaer County, 1970). 
Ifi386 
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it has been prejudiced by the timing of the Director's action 
pursuant to that rule. 
Our rules, and their relevance to the instant situation, 
are unambiguously clear as to when a filing is timely. We 
may not relieve the District of the consequences of its 
3/ premature filing without waiving our rules.— We find it 
significant that prior to April 5, 1977, our rules concerning 
dismissal of untimely improper practice charges paralleled 
the rules applicable here in that they did not restrict the 
time when a charge could be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not timely. We then promulgated paragraph (1) of §204.7, 
which provides: 
A motion may be made to dismiss a charge, or 
the administrative law judge may do so at his 
own initiative on the ground that the alleged 
violation occurred more than four months 
prior to the filing of the charge, but only 
if the failure of timeliness was first 
revealed during the hearing. An objection to 
the timeliness of the charge, if not duly 
raised, shall be deemed waived. 
There may be merit in having a similar restriction on the 
dismissal of representation cases on the ground of timeliness. 
3/Because our ultimate conclusion is based upon 
timeliness, the application has not been "processed to 
completion" and the District may file again in October or 
November 1986. See §201.10(b) of our Rules of Procedure. 
f> 0387 
Board - E-1158 -4 
However, this must be considered in the context of an 
amendment of our rules rather than as a justification for 
waiving them. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Director and 
WE ORDER.that the application herein be. and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 5, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
% £ Z ^ ^ - ^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
4/See State Administrative Procedure Act §202 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO.C-28 30 
UNITED PROFESSIONAL NURSES ASSOCIATION. BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Petitioner-Intervenor, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
EUGENE F. PIGOTT. JR.. ESQ. (MICHAEL A. 
CONNORS. ESQ.^ , of Counsel), for Employer 
MICHALEK, MONTROY, AMAN. MARRANO. TRAFALSKI & 
GORSKI. ESQS., (JEROME C. GORSKI. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Petitioner-Intervenor 
HARDER. SILBER & GILLEN, ESQS. (JEFFREY D. GILLEN. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the New 
York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) that an election should be held in a unit of 
mi 
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employees of the County of Erie (County) consisting of 
Included: Full-time, regular part-time and 
part-time employees licensed or 
otherwise lawfully authorized to 
practice as registered nurses in the 
positions specified in Appendix A. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
NYSNA argues that the Director erred in ordering such an 
election because it has already satisfied this Board's 
requirements for certification without an election, as 
specified in §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of Procedure, and 
because NYSNA and the County are parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement which was executed on December 13, 1985. 
FACTS 
The petition herein was filed by the United Professional 
Nurses Association (UPNA) on September 1, 1984. The petition 
was timely to raise a question concerning representation in 
an existing unit represented by NYSNA, and it did so. UPNA 
had asserted that the unit represented by NYSNA was 
inappropriate in that some of the employees in it should be 
removed and placed in a unit to be created along with certain 
unrepresented employees. The Director rejected this position 
and decided that the unrepresented employees should be added 
to the unit represented by NYSNA.— In the course of 
1/18 PERB W4074 (1985). Originally, the Director 
dismissed the petition. 18 PERB V4020 (1985). UPNA filed 
exceptions to that decision and we reversed it in part, 
remanding the matter to the Director for further 
proceedings. 18 PERB 1f3045 (1985). 
• 10390 
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doing so, the Director denied a request of UPNA for 
additional time to obtain a showing of support in the unit 
found to be appropriate.—' He ordered an election in that 
unit unless NYSNA would submit to him, within 15 days of the 
receipt of his decision, evidence sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of Procedure for 
certification without an election. 
On October 31, 1985, well within the 15-day period, 
NYSNA submitted evidence of support sufficient for 
certification without an election. However, on November 19, 
1985, before the Director had issued a decision indicating 
that NYSNA was qualified for certification without an 
3/ . . . 
election,— UPNA submitted evidence of sufficient support 
to become a candidate for election by the unit employees. It 
simultaneously moved to be placed on a ballot. On 
December 3, 1985, the Civil Service Employees Association 
(CSEA) also filed a motion to be placed on the ballot, which 
motion was accompanied by an appropriate showing of interest. 
2/UPNA's showing of interest had been sufficient for 
the smaller unit it claimed to be appropriate, but was not 
sufficient for the larger unit found to be appropriate. 
•^ /"The time to file exceptions to the Director's 
decision had not yet expired. It would have been 
inappropriate for the Director to act definitively before 
the time to file exceptions had expired. 
10391 
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Ten days later, NYSNA and the County executed a 
memorandum of agreement covering the employees in NYSNA1s 
original unit. 
The Director issued the decision herein on February 10. 
1986. It determined that an election should be held, and it 
granted the motions of UPNA and CSEA to be placed upon the 
ballot. The Director reasoned that an election was required 
because §201.9(g)(2) of our Rules of Procedure provides that 
"[a]n election will be held whenever the choice available to 
the employees within a negotiating unit includes more than 
one employee organization . . . ." He rejected NYSNA's 
contention that its submission of evidence sufficient for 
certification without an election on October 31, 1985, 
precluded an election on the basis of submissions by UPNA and 
CSEA thereafter. He also rejected NYSNA1s argument that the 
execution of its memorandum of agreement with the County bars 
an election. The matter now comes to us on NYSNA's 
exceptions to these rulings. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the Director. For the reasons 
stated in the Director's decision, the execution of the 
memorandum of agreement does not bar an election.— 
i/The Director had ruled that this was so because a 
question concerning representation involving the 
negotiating unit covered by the agreement was pending 
before this Board at the time when the memorandum of 
agreement was executed. For further analysis and citations 
of authority see the decision of the Director. 
10392 
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NYSNA misreads the Director's decision regarding the 
implications of its submission of evidence sufficient for 
certification without an election. Reading it in the context 
of the Director's earlier decision that UPNA would not be 
given additional time to submit evidence of support 
sufficient to be placed upon the ballot in the negotiating 
unit determined to be appropriate, NYSNA understood him as 
having ruled that UPNA's actions subsequent to NYSNA's 
submission of evidence sufficient for certification without 
an election would be without effect. However, the earlier 
decision of the Director merely holds that there would be no 
delay in the processing of the proceeding in order to permit 
UPNA to submit additional evidence of support; the Director 
would process the matter within the normal time frame, and 
UPNA's evidence of additional support would be considered 
only if it were submitted before a Director's decision might 
be issued with respect to certification without an election. 
It is not an employee organization's submission of 
evidence sufficient for certification without an election 
that precludes other employee organizations from appearing on 
a ballot; this occurs when the Director determines that the 
requirements for certification without an election have been 
met. This is because an election is the only reliable means 
1G393 
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of ascertaining the preferences of unit employees where there 
is substantial support for more than one employee 
organization, such as is the case here. To permit an 
employee organization to cut off the access of other employee 
organizations to a ballot by quickly submitting evidence 
sufficient for certification without an election would 
deprive the unit employees of an opportunity to express their 
preferences in an election. Accordingly, we hold open the 
possibility of an election until the Director has actually 
counted and evaluated the evidence submitted in support of 
certification without an election. This preserves the rights 
of the unit employees, while not delaying certification, 
where competing employee organizations enjoy substantial 
support among unit employees. 
NOW THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret 
ballot be held under the supervision of the Director among 
the employees in the following unit who were employed on the 
payroll date immediately preceding the date of this decision: 
Included: Full-time, regular part-time and part-time 
employees licensed or otherwise lawfully 
authorized to practice as registered nurses 
in the positions specified in Appendix A. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County shall submit to the 
Director and to the other parties, within fifteen days from the 
date of receipt of this decision, an alphabetized list of all 
1€394 
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employees within said unit who were employed on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision. 
DATED: June 5, 198 6 
Albany. New York 
^ U ^ ^ k^^jn^t^k. 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman r-\ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT JERVIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
Respondent, 
""-and-" 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
PORT JERVIS, 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (JOHN H. JURGENS. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN H. SCHER. ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In the first charge herein, the City School District of 
the City of Port Jervis (District) alleges that the Port 
Jervis Teachers Association (Association) repudiated an 
agreement reached in collective negotiations. That agreement 
was contained in a document entitled "Stipulation of 
Agreement" which provided that the provisions of the 
expired agreement would continue except as modified, 
specified the following as one of the modifications: 
(8) The new salary schedule each year 
shall be composed of the salaries received by 
teachers in the previous year including 
increments plus 6-1/2% of the gross payroll 
in that previous year. If the numbers of 
unit members is greater in 1984-85 than in 
1983-84 (and thereafter for the life of the 
agreement), expenditures for the wages of 
CASE NOS. U-8076 
and U-8168 
p a r t i e s ' 
and 
10396 
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the excess staff shall be in addition to the 
above amounts. These same increases on this 
same basis shall be applied effective July 1, 
1985 and July 1. 1986. The distribution of 
this money among unit members on staff as of 
each September shall be determined by the 
PJTA, except that the PJTA's allocation 
shall not reduce the salary received by any 
unit member in the previous year. (Emphasis 
supplied.) ..•--._...:_.....-•..- ...:._. 
The Association prepared a table for the distribution of 
the money which reflected an increase of approximately 11% per 
teacher. It is the submission of that table by the 
Association which the District characterizes as a repudiation 
of the agreement. 
At the pre-hearing conference, the Association justified 
the table by its interpretation of the language "gross payroll 
in that previous year". It asserted that the teachers were 
entitled to the benefit of "breakage", i.e., the savings 
resulting from teacher turnover, whereby lower paid new 
teachers replace resigning or retiring higher priced teachers. 
The District then brought its second charge as an 
alternative to the first. It alleges that there was a mutual 
misunderstanding with respect to the implications of the 
parties' "Stipulation of Agreement" which nullified that 
agreement. Accordingly, it argues, the Association is under a 
duty to resume negotiations, and it refused to do so. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the second 
charge on the ground that the parties had reached an agreement 
on salaries, and that the Association was therefore not 
10397 
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obligated to negotiate the issue further. He found it 
irrelevant that the parties may have had different 
understandings as to the implications of their agreement. 
After a short hearing, the ALJ declined to take further 
evidence:With respect to the first charge on the ground that 
the District was attempting to use the improper practice 
process to impose its interpretation of the agreement. He 
noted that §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law provides that this 
Board may not enforce an agreement.— 
In addition to disputing the ALJ's determination on the 
merits, the District argues that he rejected material evidence 
2/ by reason of a misapplication of the parol evidence rule.-
That rule precludes evidence to contradict or vary the terms 
of an integrated written instrument. The District argues that 
parol evidence was admissible because it was trying to prove 
that there is no agreement. 
i^The ALJ dismissed the charges on November 27, 1985, 
and the exceptions were received on January 9. 1986. We 
delayed issuing a decision herein at the request of the 
parties. The reason for the delay was to afford the 
parties an opportunity to resolve the dispute between them 
through negotiations. The time that they requested for 
this purpose expired on May 21, 1986. 
^The District also objects to our consideration of 
materials which the Association appended to its brief to 
the ALJ on the ground that these materials were not part of 
the record. We have not considered those materials. 
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The record shows that notwithstanding a motion by the 
Association that he do so, the ALJ did not apply the parol 
3/ 
evidence rule.- On the contrary, having previously 
ascertained from the parol evidence of the District's 
witness and its attorney that the "memorandum of agreement" 
embodied the parties' entire agreement, he stopped the 
hearing when he determined that the sole issue before him 
involved the interpretation and enforcement of an agreement. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the ALJ's finding 
that the "memorandum of agreement" embodied the parties' 
entire agreement. We also affirm his conclusion that there 
was an agreement, notwithstanding the parties' different 
understandings as to its implications. In Sylvan-Verona 
Beach CSD. 15 PERB 1f3067 (1982). we said (at 3105): 
While the District's negotiators may not 
have understood the implications of their 
agreement, such a misunderstanding is not a 
valid basis for repudiating the agreement, 
[citation omitted] 
Accordingly, we conclude, as did the ALJ, that the parties 
agreed upon a formula for the granting of salary increases fo 
the 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 school years, and that the 
charges question the meaning of the language that the parties 
agreed upon. The ALJ correctly held that this Board may not 
resolve that issue in the context of the instant charges. 
1/We are therefore not addressing the question 
whether it would have been wrong for him to do so. 
Board - U-8076/U-8168 -5 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges herein be, and 
they hereby are. dismissed. 
DATED: June 5, 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Z' 
^ ^rf^C^SL-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membei 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT JERVIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
AFT NO. 2937. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8030 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, 
Charging Party. 
ROBERT G. KLEIN, for Respondent 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by John Thomas McAndrew. He 
complains that the Port Jervis Teachers Association, AFT No. 
2937 (Association) violated its duty of fair representation 
by not supporting him in connection with five grievances 
which he filed on October 15, 1984. Specifically he makes 
four complaints: 
(1) The Association did not investigate the grievances 
adequately and it acted improperly in refusing to 
permit him to meet with the Grievance Committee 
and/or the Executive Committee to discuss the 
grievances. 
(2) The Association did not inform him why it refused to 
take the grievances to arbitration. 
10401 
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(3) The Association acted improperly in not making three 
witnesses available to testify in support of the 
grievances. 
(4) The Association did not provide him with official 
tapes of the hearing at Stage III (consideration by 
the school district's Board of Education) of the 
grievances. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held an extensive 
hearing lasting three days, after which she dismissed the 
charge. She found that the Association had not been 
negligent in its consideration of the grievances and that 
there was no evidence that it discriminated against 
) McAndrew. She also found that the Association had told 
McAndrew why it would not take his grievances to arbitration, 
the reason being lack of merit. She concluded that the 
Association was under no obligation to provide the testimony 
at the grievance hearing which was sought by McAndrew, and 
that it was under no obligation to furnish him with an 
official copy of the tapes of the Stage III hearing on the 
grievances. 
The matter now comes to us on McAndrew's exceptions. We 
affirm the ALJ's substantive findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. There is no need to treat with the ALJ's dismissal 
of the first and second specifications of the charge other 
than to affirm that they are not supported by the evidence. 
) 
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Her dismissal of the third and fourth specifications, also 
affirmed, requires some elaboration. 
In large part, the grievances complain that McAndrew was 
not given appropriate consideration by the school district 
for an assignment which he sought. The reason for this is 
that another employee was given that assignment in settlement 
of a grievance filed by that other employee. McAndrew asked 
the Association to produce that employee, the Association's 
President, and the chairman of its grievance committee as 
witnesses. He hoped to prove that they had acted 
improperly. In part, he may have believed that this would 
help him in connection with his grievance. At least in part, 
he intended to embarrass the Association's officers because 
he was running for Association President against a candidate 
supported by the current officers. In any event, the duty of 
fair representation does not obligate the Association to 
submit voluntarily to his interrogation. His request that 
the Association produce the three witnesses constitutes, at 
best, a fishing expedition. 
The Association had a copy of the minutes of the Stage 
III hearing in its possession and offered it to McAndrew. He 
rejected it on the ground that it might have been altered by 
the Association President. The Association rejected his 
request for an "official" copy of the tape because it had 
none. In these circumstances, the "rejection" is not 
improper. 
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McAndrew directs three additional exceptions to rulings 
of the ALJ at the hearing. We find these exceptions, which 
follow, to be without merit. 
The first is that the ALJ erred in not compelling the 
Association to produce minutes of meetings of the Executive 
Committee of the Association at which another grievance had 
been considered. He argues that this evidence would have 
shown discriminatory treatment of his grievances. 
There is nothing in the record to show that this is the 
reason why McAndrew sought to introduce those minutes. On 
the contrary, it appears that his attempt to introduce them 
was part of the fishing expedition referred to above. 
The second is that the ALJ erred by admitting minutes of 
an Association meeting in October 1983 because he was not 
permitted to examine the person who was President of the 
Association at that time regarding the manner in which the 
minutes were taken and whether they had been appropriately 
approved at a subseguent meeting. 
These minutes show that procedures followed by the 
Association's President had been authorized at the meeting. 
While the record does not show whether the adoption was con-
sistent with the requirements of the Association's bylaws, 
the resultant issue is one which concerns internal 
Association affairs and raises no question regarding the 
Association's duty of fair representation. To evidence a 
10404 
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violation of that duty, the record would have to show that 
grievance procedure was discriminatorily applied rather than 
that it was improperly adopted. It does not do so. 
The third is that the ALJ erred by excluding the 
introduction of the Association's constitution and bylaws. 
McAndrew had attempted to introduce them for the purpose of 
showing that the procedures followed by the Association 
President were not authorized. 
This raises the same issue that we considered under 
McAndrew1s second argument. Our reason for rejecting 
McAndrew's position there is applicable here. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ. and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: June 5, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
ULMZL £ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2G-6/5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MASTIC-MORICHES-SHIRLEY 
COMMUNITY LIBRARY, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-303 9 
MASTIC-MORICHES-SHIRLEY COMMUNITY 
LIBRARY ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES, 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 30, 1985, the Mastic-Moriches-Shirley 
Community Library Association of Municipal Employees 
(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition for certification as the exclusive 
negotiating representative of certain employees employed by 
the Mastic-Moriches-Shirley Community Library (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties agreed to a negotiating unit 
as follows: 
Included: All full-time and part-time custodial 
employees, clerical employees and pages. 
Excluded: Head of Circulation Services, Head of 
Administrative Services and all other 
employees. 
Pursuant to agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
10406 
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held on April 2. 1986. at which there were 17 ballots cast 
in favor of representation by petitioner and 21 ballots 
against representation by petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that 
a majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast 
ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner. IT IS ORDERED that 
the petition should be, and hereby is. dismissed.— 
DATED: June 5, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
1/ The petitioner filed, but later withdrew, objections 
to employer conduct affecting the results of the 
election. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2951 
BROOKHAVEN TOWN ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
LOCAL 852. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 852, Civil Service 
Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in the 
unit described in the attached Appendix, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances, 
Certification - C-2951 page 2 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 852, Civil Service 
Employees Association and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: June 5. 198 6 
Albany, New York 
-^fc^g- €. A£™ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memaer 
APPENDIX 
AEO 
Laborer 
Highway Labor Crew Leader 
MM I 
Heavy Equipment Operator 
Highway Maintenance Crew Leader 
Highway General Supervisor 
HEO 
MM III 
MM II 
Automotive Mechanic III 
Dispatcher 
Paint Shop Crew Leader 
Sign Painter I 
Construction Equipment Operator 
Highway Zone Supervisor 
Storekeeper 
Mat. Control Clerk II 
Boat Captain 
Guard 
Auto Mech. IV 
MM IV 
Auto Mech I 
Ecology Project Supervisor 
Material Cont. Clerk II 
Groundskeeper III 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PEMBROKE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
•••-•.••----• and- CASE NO, G-3Q3I 
PEMBROKE SCHOOL-RELATED PERSONNEL 
FEDERATION. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Pembroke School-Related 
Personnel Federation has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All clerk-typists, typists, secretaries, 
receptionists, account-clerk typists, 
registered nurses, teacher aides, 
custodians, custodial workers, head 
custodians, maintenance men, cleaners, 
Xerox aides, library aides, and clerical 
aides. 
Certification - C-3031 page 2 
Excluded: Bus drivers. Secretary to the 
Superintendent, and Treasurer/Secretary 
to the Business Manager. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Pembroke School-Related 
Personnel Federation and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: June 5, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Luu^ ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
I€412 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
GLEN COVE. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-29 57 
LOCAL 810. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMAN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 810, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs, Warehouseman and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named employer, in the unit described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time secretarial, 
clerical and school aides personnel. 
10413 
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Excluded: Secretary to the superintendent of 
schools, secretary to the assistant 
superintendent for business and 
secretary to the assistant super-
intendent for personnel. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 810, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman and Helpers of 
America and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: June 5, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
/lik^&e /? ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Memtfer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
50 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY. NEW YORK 12205 
(518) 457-2614 
June 4„ .1986 
Professor Thomas C. Barry 
323 Lamarck Drive 
Amherst, NY 14226 
Dear Doctor Barry: 
The Board has asked me to respond to your letter of 
June 2C 1986. In that letter you write about the agency fee 
rebate procedures adopted by UUP. You complain that UUP is 
not in compliance with State law or the U.S. Constitution 
and ask this Board to suspend UUP's right to collect agency 
fees. 
PERB does not have authority to police the general 
conduct of unions with respect to agency shop fees. Indeed, 
you recognized this as indicated by your urging the Board to 
promulgate rules that you have proposed. Your proposed rule 
changes will be considered by the Board at a hearing which 
will be held on September 9„ 1986 at The Hilton, in 
Syracuse. Until such time as the Board may adopt 
substantive rules governing agency shop fees, it may only 
deal with matters such as those referred to in your letter 
on a case-by-case basis where improper practice charges have 
been filed. 
JL/mk 
Very truly yours, 
/ 
Jerome Lefk/witz 
'Deputy Chairman 
10«5 
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO 
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
323 Lamarck.Dr. 
. M K M S E W S W n a i Amherst, H»T. 1U226 
TO THE BOARD 
NOTICE OF VIOLATION OF NUMEROUS BOARD ORDERS, BEGINNING WITH 11 PERB 3078, BY THE 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIOI^SAS THE" RESULT- 0? A NEW R^EBATE'*- PROCEDURE FOR 
•AGENCY FEES* VKICH IT PROMULGATED ON CR ABOUT 27 MAI I986 
ANB 
AN URGENT REQUEST THAT AS THE RESULT OF THE ABOVE THE PERB SUSPEND IMMEDIATELY THE 
RIGHT OF THIS TRADE UNION TO COLLECT A3 Y "AGENCY FEES'5 FROM INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES 
AND THAT THE BOARD PROMULGATE ITSELF ASYSTBM FOR REGULATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INDEPENBENT EMPLOYEE A^ TD TRADE UNION THAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY PROCEDURAL. JUSTICE 
1 8 On' or about 27 May I986 I received a copy of therOUP's pub l i ca t ion 
The Voice (a rag I normally throw away without looking a t , bu t perused t h i s time as 
the r e s u l t of h i n t s and references given by an a t to rney for respondent UUP a t a hearing 
concerning an i „ p . he ld o& 15 May) on p . 1 of which was t h e noticed "New Agency Fee 
Rebate Procedures for 1986-87, p.U"'. Page U of the rag contained a desc r ip t ion of 
a new n reba te K procedure, which 1 am including a s ANNEX A. I have a l s o , for purposes 
of comparison, included the "rebate" procedure i n e f fec t for 1985/86 as ANNEX B, 
Please remember i t i s Annex A, the new procedure, about which I am w r i t i n g t h i s notice 
2 . This new pffscedure, members of the B d . , i s "fey fa r the worst ever misconceived 
"by the UUPy as I s h a l l d e t a i l below. I t i s so horrendous and so s tup id , and so coer-
c ive , t h a t I must bel ieve i t was the r e s u l t of some kind of co l l e c t i ve malevolent 
incompetence which has always, though never t o t h i s ^ e x t e n t , charac te r i sed the UUP1s 
a t t i t u d e toward independent employees. 
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3. First of all, I want the members of the Bd. to read ANNEX A very carefully to ; 
i . 
determine that in no respect whatsoever is it & valid refund procedure, as required \ 
by &d. rules, because under it no independent employee is permitted to contest 
the actual amount of the fee, let alone receive sufficient financial information to 
do so. You will have observed that the only matter which indepednent employees 
are allowed to contest is the ^appropriateness of the advanced reduction". Examine 
the documentcarefully and you-will: see that this is the only appeals procedure provide 
There is no relationship whatsoever between the question of the Kappropriatenessrof 
the advanced reduction18 ani. the determination based upon actual financial evidence
 r &n> 
upon the requirements ofxpaCBK proof (Abood) of what was the actual amount of the 
service fee« 
lt« The Bd. understands better than anyone that while it is absolutely necessary that 
the union provide a. systesa whereby I am not forced to subsidise illegal expenditures, 
(escrow, advanced reduction, etc) this is only the first part of the procedure to 
determine that I have paid only thos® fees which are required by law. lou also feder-
stand that the level of financial information required and the lack of any possibili 
of gfBSSZf proof means that any arbitrator determining "the appropriateness of the 
advanced reductida" is not and cannot be performing the task of deteraining them 
exact amount of the service fee• 
$9 It is grotesque. ^heBappropriateness of the advanced reduction" must be determine 
by the arbitrator upon some analogy withthe expenditures of earlier FX8s. That is, 
there must be some earlier refund procedure which in.fact provided a precise deterrdn 
on of proper and improper expenditures, in order for the arbitrator not to be constm 
ing estimate upon estimate upon estimate. There must, in order for the estimate to i 
any meaning at all, have been some prior final determination of the corahttamount 
of the fee. But nowhere in this new procedure is this provided for. There is no wa; 
for any independent employee to participate in such a determination!) 
541.7 
•, . ^ d o x The t M x * rzTt.lTa.ja s t a t e s . 
* »• E^^SS^^^ 1^ 4 " " " " „ .
 r e i u o e i for tte *«* n 
The^ ^-£*sr.; ?^«-^ ;%re\r-^ "* 
, _-*i*v>1» a u d i t * SUCO p a A j r w ^ ^ ^ , _ 
said avai lable audit* 
Absurd. Inhere does t h i s coaes froaa? I s i t an assumption t h a t the re has ^©©n a f u l l -
sca le determination of the ac tual fee a t some e a r l i e r FT? There cannot fee, because 
none i s ?roTi^ed for i n t h e ne^ ru lese Has the independent enployee p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 
t h i s frocess? Has he received the necessary f i n a n c i a l information? "Of" course n o t » J 
"Who has determined the accurac y ©f of the fees Hspent by the "union fo r such purposes' 
The 'onion, of course., 
7» What i s going on? &s closely as 1 ean t e l l the a r b i t r a t o r i s going t o be asked 
to examine the f inanc ia l records of the union for some previous FT i n order t o determine 
Based 
vhat the union i s now expending, Saosd upon what? Simply /because t h e records have keen 
*audited* does not mean t ha t they i n any sense accurate ly r e f l e c t the ac tua l amount spent 
on i l l e g a l i tems from t h a t previous FT where there bass, been no chal lenge of the actual 
amount• 
8, Please note as well that this procedure completely eliminates the possibility that 
independent employees shall receive sufficient financial information to allow them to 
challenge the actual amount of the service fee„ (13 PERB 3090) 
9. ^leasc note as well that this procedure describes itself as referring only tocthe 
expenditures of the UUP and excludes lay its terms any possibility that expenditures by 
its affiliates would be included. 
10j Oh, yes. And the requiremoits of "expedition"? Blown out the window, since the ac 
amount can ncrcr be determined by these, rules* This, even for the UUP, is a new time rec 
A H right. The question is what are you going to do about this piece of malevalen 
incompetence. It isn't a matter of tinkering, of adjusting a sentence here, a phrase ther 
H3SS Those days are over. The UUP has shown repeatedly that it is -completely incapable 
j-ftiiMffliTifrlr of devising a system of r e l a t i onsh ip s "between i t s e l f and independent employees 
t h a t i s charac ter ised by procedural j u s t i c e . I t has had nine years of t r y i n g , and has j 
> a i l e d . This l a t e s t attempt i s the worst of a l l . Enough i s enough! Now i t i s tjjrae 
(and p a s t time) for you to determine and t o guarantee the nature of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
by your promulgation of ru les (cf . my proposal for Pa r t 210 of the Bd. *s r u l e s ) which 
are charac te r i sed by procedural j u s t i c e . This i s your most urgent t a s k . wot©that on 
15 June j, a matter of two weeks, these r u l e s taEBSSSsgaE require t h a t independent employees 
make t h e i r objection ( to what?) khowa. You have v e r y l i t t l e t i j as . 
X. Immediately sysp«nd the r i g h t of TOP t o co l l ec t "agency fees" since: i t 
laaoesd&dBesteKKi: does not now h&vs a va l id refund procedure i n e f f e c t . 
(Note the recent confirmation bf the Third Bep5 t . i n Bo&a^ga t h a t the 
UUP has no r i g h t t o receive ^Agency Fees" i f i t does not have i n place 
a va l id refund procedure, and tha t you have the r i g h t t o determins. whether 
i t does or does not have a va l id refisnt procedure.) 
2 e P s ^ ^ ^ e Passt 210 of your r u l e s , as I have previously requested 
3„ Restore to UUP r i g h t to co l l ec t "agency fees" upon i t s agreement t o 
comply with t^e standards contained t h e r e i n . 
Copy: Jerome Lefkowits, Esq. 
Martin Barr , Esq. 
H o s ^ S i n c e r e l ^ 
Thomas C. Barry» Ph.D. 
Chairman Class ics 
M r , Rel igious Studies Progr. 
Fellow of the Undergrade College 
Universi ty a t Buffalo 
323 Lamarck Br . 
Amherst, * . T . 11*226 
AGENCY FEE REBATE PROCEDURE FOR THE 1986-87 FISCAL YEAR 
Any person making service payments to the 
Union in lieu of dues, pursuant to Chapter 677, 
Laws of 1977, as amended by Chapter 678, Laws of 
1977 and Chapter 122, Laws of 1978, shall have the 
right to object to the expenditure of any part of the 
agency fee which represents the employee's pro-rata 
share of expenditures by the Union or its affiliates in 
aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentally related to terms and condi-
tions of employment. 
Such objections shall be made, if at all, by the 
objector individually notifying the Union President 
of his/her objection by registered or certified mail, 
during the period between June 15 and June 30 of the 
year prior to the fiscal year of the Union to which the 
objection applies. 
The agency fee of such objectors shall be re-
duced for the next fiscal year by the approximate 
proportion of the agency fees spent by the Union for 
such purposes, based on the latest fiscal year for 
which there is a completed and available audit. An 
objector shall be provided at the beginning of the 
new fiscal year with an advance payment equal to the 
amount of the reduction. 
If an objector is dissatisfied with the reduced fee 
on the ground that it allegedly does not accurately 
reflect the expenditures of the Union in the defined 
area, he/she may appeal that determination in 
writing and send it to the Union President by cer-
tified or registered mail within thirty (30) days 
following receipt of the advanced reduction. The 
question of appropriateness of the advance reduction 
will be submitted by the Union to a neutral party ap-
pointed by the American Arbitration Association for 
expeditious hearing and resolution in accordance 
with its rules for agency fee arbitrations. The costs 
for any appeal to a neutral party shall be borne by the 
Union. Said appeal shall be heard expeditiously. 
The Union, at its option, may consolidate ail ap-
peals and have them resolved at one hearing for that 
purpose. An objector may present his/her appeal in 
person. 
The schedule of UUP expenses may be found on Page 6 of the February/March edition of The VOICE. 
In Jyne " ^ 
in mid-June, the Public Employees in which you last appeared on the payroll . 
Benefit Fund will mail new Prescription as an active State employee. 
Drag ID cards to all.eligible employees in
 IMPORTANT: You are eligible for 
the Professional Services Negotiating ^
 fi j f . j ^ p s N U d . - ^ j . _ * . , 
Umt (PSNU) who have completed and
 d i i b , £ for e*n r o l l r n e n t i n ^ S t a t e H e a l t h © f O l f a C f O f S 
filed an Enrollment Card with the Fund. in,„nrirt, p r r > a - , m 
One Enrollment Card, on file with the m s u r a n c e ™gram. Four members of UUP were elected 
Fund will enable you to receive both e I f y ° u m e e t F u n d el igibil i ty to the NYSUT Board of Directors at 
Fund benefits — Prescription Drug and requirements and do not receive your the Representative Assembly held 
Dental The new ID card will expire Prescription Drug ID card, complete an in Toronto from March 6-9. 
12/31/86 The current card expires Enrollment Card (PEBF-U1) and President Nuala Dreseher was 
6/30/86 return it. to the Fund office elected in at-large balloting. Voting 
If vou have individual benefit Fund immediately. for three UUP seats resulted in a 
coverage the ID card will cover the ° Sf your ID cards do not show all of your run^off election. The final counting 
member only. If you have family benefit eligible dependents, complete a new of the votes resulted in the election 
Fund coverage you will receive two drug Enrollment Card, or a Change of Man- of John Reilly of Albany, Thomas 
ID cards for your convenience. The face I a l S t a t u s - D e p e n d e n t s Form Matthews of Geneseo, and Henry 
of your ID card will show only the first (PEBF-U3). This will enable the Fund Steck of Cortland. 
seven letters of your eligible dependent's t 0 i s s u e y° u correct ID cards. The
 v o t e c o u n t j n ^ first ' 
first name. Only those dependents listed ° Report any address changes to the Fund .election: 
on the card will be eligible for coverage. o f f , c e immediately to ensure that your RexDy . . . . ! ' 8547 
If a dependent child be.omes 25 within n e w I D c a r d s a r c s e n t t 0 m e c o r r e c t Steck 8354 
this six month period, the date of the end address. Alfonsin . . . .
 r" . . . 7 9 7 8 
of the month in which your dependent If you do not receive your new ID Matthews : . . 7977 
reaches 25 will appear next to the cards, notify the Fund office by writing or Edwards , 7785 
dependent's name. In the event that any calling: UUP/Public Employees Benefit Nagler . . : 7595* 
"your eligible dependents loses his/her Fund, PO Box 911, Madison Square j j ,
 t } i e run-off election the vote 
eligibility, the card becomes void for Station, NewYork, NY 10159. Toll-free count: 
his/her use. If the member should become 1-800-522-7002 or (212) 420-1309. Be Thomas Matthews • 8357 
ineligible, e.g., resign from State service sure to include your full name. Social Mary Edwards .7785 
or retire, the ID card is valid for use until Security Number, address and business 
the end of the month following the month phone. *! f\ 
ill I D <%»*:_.. T. .~—£—B—:. .J . : : " 
\PptpQfr fe 
1985-86 UUP 
AGENCY SHOP FEE REFUND PROCEDURE 
ilGENCY FEE KEE/OT FHOCEDtStE FCHt'THE mSM FISCAL YEAS 
Aay perse* SMfcsetg swvfee peyaaessas. te ties Uaaon ia !Se» of dues* 
pswswoat so Gup&r 677, Laws of 1977, ss saKstdedby-GapieroTS,' 
Laws of 1977 mi 0*p*sf 122, Laws of iWS, sbsil lam; {He righs 
to object to Sits expa«&!K?€ of any part of the sgsssey fee wfekfe 
rcpreaests the esagitoyse's pro-rata share of eqpsadktmss fey the UR» 
wa or k» affiliate* is tad of acdiviiks or csasscs of a polities! or ideo-
logical mease oaSy tae&eaSBZh/ related to t a r c sod cosdjtsaas of 
cmptoygicat. 
Sadi 
/Botifyiag 
«r certified 
feer30 
tiofl cpptks. 
T&erealks- tfc ageecy fee s&sS be re&iced is accesslafise witfe suds 
ebjectkws fey the sppreHtsBSBte pcopoftStnef the sgeacy fees speal by 
fee Uaica fbrstds pssfssee*, bemed am dw. Sa&sC fissrf year &«r wtads 
then b a coexisted sad sysSa^e sadk. Alter jtfee e*d of fee fiscal 
year, sad a&er fee sedk of fee feso&s- cs.CNRpfeted. {fee USICR shall 
{toM'wiine.. ^ e sypwyeaawge prep&rgies of agency feesacassSly spent 
' by the Uak» Sw ancle paapgaes «tese§ sfes &SES£ year. A&sr sseSs fins! 
rebate dcsercanadoM k made en adjuetaafigt. If aeeesi»ry,wSS fee made 
sfeeS bs sesfe* if aes8, by 8h§ ebjeeteer individo* 
Uwos PreskSc^c^fek/tercfej*csie«by roistered 
awH. <btria$ the period betweea Sep&gabcr 1 and Septera-
fjssal yea? of the Uak*s is whkSs she obJcc° 
ia &c refused anxxsnL Objectors will be required to refund to the Uor 
» s aay excess refund they may have received. 
If an objector is dissatisfied with rite final rebate determmattcfi, 
made after the close of the fiscal year, on the grouad that it assertafly 
dees EO! accurately reflect the expenditures of the Ua'too in the ch-
fiaed area, he/she may appeal that determination to the^Ueion's Ex-
ecutive Board. This appeal shall be in writing and tent to the U-ntoe 
PresideaS fey certified or registered mail within thirty (30) days fbl-
lewwg- receipt of the foal rebate- detefminatkist. 
If ths cbjecSor a dissatisfied with the Executive Beard's detemw* 
radon, the cbjecsor may appeal to a eeutrsl by notifying the Uakxs 
Preadesg by regssered or certified nrssil within thirty (30) days after 
receJpS of ms Executive Board's decksoss. The question of appnspri-
sSeasess of the rebste will be submitted by fee Union to a saiiraJ party 
appoiated by the U*ce from Issts.to be supplied by the American Ar-
fckiatk» AssodadoB for bearing aad resolutioa. The cose Ibfai^'ap-
peal to a ssesfcnaS party shall be borne by Sse Unk>s. Said sppsal shall 
bs feeanl espeditkwssjy. 
t he Uoioa, Bt iss option, may ccosolidate aii appeals and have 
fester ^jpea! ia; pcrsoa. 
APPENDIX " 1 ' 
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